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Comment
After Warren:

Revisiting Taxpayer Standing and the
Constitutionality of Parsonage Allowances
Phil Bednar*

Richard Warren, a Baptist minister, received a housing
allowance of approximately $80,000 each year from his church.'
He claimed the entire amount as a tax exclusion under 26
U.S.C. § 107(2), which at the time stated that rental allowances
paid to "minister[s] of the gospel"2 (i.e., parsonage allowances)
are excluded from gross income. 3 The IRS claimed the
exclusion amount was excessive because it was greater than his
home's fair market rental value.4 Neither party raised the
issue of whether § 107(2) was unconstitutional.5 The U.S. Tax
*

J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 1997,

University of Virginia. I would like to thank Professors Gregg Polsky and
Adam Samaha for their helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like
to thank Hansem (Dawn) Kim and James P. Toomey for their valuable
commentary. Finally, I am indebted to the Staff and Editors of the Minnesota
Law Review for their contributions.
1. Warren v. Comm'r, 302 F.3d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. The Internal Revenue Code at § 107 does not define "minister of the
gospel." See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2002). The corresponding Treasury
regulation does not specifically define "minister of the gospel," although it does
provide examples of ordinary duties of ministers, such as "the performance of
sacerdotal functions [and] the conduct of religious worship." See 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.107-1 (2002). Neither the statute nor the Treasury regulation indicate a
preference for a particular religious denomination. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107; 26
C.F.R. § 1.107-1. If that were the case, courts would treat § 107 as suspect
and apply a strict scrutiny test for constitutionality. See Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982). For purposes of this Comment, the parsonage
allowance is interpreted as providing tax benefits to religious organizations as
a whole.
3. Warren, 302 F.3d at 1013.
4. Id. at 1013-14. The fair rental value of Reverend Warren's home was
between $50,000 and $60,000 during the years at issue. See Warren v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 343, 344 (2000).
5. See Warren, 302 F.3d at 1014 (noting that the court brought up the
issue of the constitutionality of § 107(2) by requesting supplemental briefing
from the parties and amici); see also 148 CONG. REC. H1299 (daily ed. Apr. 16,
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Court ruled in Reverend Warren's favor, holding that the
§ 107(2) parsonage allowance tax exclusion may exceed the
6
home's fair market rental value.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appointed
Erwin Chemerinsky, a professor at the University of Southern
California Law School, as amicus curiae and requested that the
parties and amici submit briefs on whether the court should
consider the constitutionality of § 107(2). 7 In May 2002, the
parties agreed to dismiss the government's appeal.8 On the
same day, Chemerinsky filed an opposition to dismissal, and
seven days later he filed a motion to intervene as a private
taxpayer, arguing that intervention should be permitted in his
case to bring a larger facial challenge to the constitutionality of
§ 107(2) and prevent the government from avoiding the
corresponding First Amendment issues. 9
On August 26, 2002, the Ninth Circuit denied
Chemerinsky's motion, concluding that Chemerinsky must
bring his case at the federal district court level.' 0 As a result,
the constitutionality of the tax exclusion for ministers remains
at issue. Some have argued that the cash housing allowance
tax exclusion for ministers is a violation of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause and a potential source of
abuse."I Others have argued that not only is this tax exclusion

2002) (statement of Rep. Ramstad) ("Neither party in the case even raised the
constitutionality issue or requested the court to consider that issue .....
6. Warren, 114 T.C. at 351.
7. Warren v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2002).

It is a

well-established canon of construction, however, that courts should "avoid
reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them." Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assoc., 485 U.S. 439,
445 (1988). Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit found § 107's constitutionality
significant enough to warrant an appointment of amicus to file a brief on this
issue; furthermore, the court stated that a taxpayer challenge could "proceed

expeditiously" when filed at the district court level. Warren, 302 F.3d at 1014,
1016.
8.

Warren, 302 F.3d at 1014.

9. Id.
10. Id. at 1014-15. The Ninth Circuit decided this case on intervention
grounds. See id. at 1015. It concluded that Chemerinksy did not meet the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 to properly intervene in
the existing case. Id. This Comment does not dispute the Ninth Circuit's

rationale for its decision. It does, however, address issues that resulted from
the court's decision.
11. Id. at 1015, 1016 n.6; see also Eric Rakowski, Are Federal Income Tax
Preferences for Ministers' Housing Constitutional?, 95 TAX NOTES 775, 776

(2002).
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constitutional, 12 but also the economic welfare of clergy
depends heavily on the tax savings generated by the
exclusion. 13 The Ninth Circuit considered the issue important
enough to warrant a supplemental briefing from the parties
and amici on whether the court should consider the
constitutionality of the tax exclusion. 14 Because of the court's
ruling, however, this issue will have to be decided on another
day. Furthermore, because a taxpayer, even in federal district
court, may not necessarily be able to file suit questioning the
constitutionality of a federal tax provision, 15 it is uncertain
whether any court will decide on the constitutionality of the tax
exclusion at issue in Warren.
This Comment picks up where the Ninth Circuit Warren
court left off. It analyzes the aftermath of Warren using a
background of cases, rules, and commentary, and it argues that
not only does a taxpayer have standing to file suit in federal
district court questioning the constitutionality of the tax
exclusion, but also that the taxpayer's suit will be successful.
Part I provides an overview of the parsonage allowance. Part II
describes relevant cases and principles relating to taxpayer
standing, the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, and
tax exemptions for religious organizations. Part III analyzes a
taxpayer's ability to bring suit at the federal district court level,
and it also addresses the constitutionality of the tax exclusion
at issue in Warren. This Comment concludes that the tax
exclusion likely violates the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.

12. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Dr. Warren, the ParsonageExclusion, and the
First Amendment, 95 TAX NOTES 115, 120 (2002) (concluding that the tax

exclusion is constitutional).
13.

See 148 CONG. REC. H1299 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Rep.

Ramstad) ("Clergy members of every faith and denomination rely on the
housing allowance. Without it, America's clergy face a devastating tax
increase of $2.3 billion over the next 5 years."); see also 148 CONG. REC. S2957
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus) ("[We risk losing a longstanding benefit that is terribly important to hundreds of thousands of
ministers, priests, rabbis and other clergy all across America.").
14. See Warren v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 1119, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
the appointment of Chemerinsky as amicus and the court's request for
supplemental briefs on the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 107(2)).
15. See infra Part II.A (discussing case precedent regarding taxpayer
standing).
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I. THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE: TAX EXCLUSIONS
FOR MINISTERS OF THE GOSPEL
The Internal Revenue Code has historically provided for
ministers a tax exclusion pertaining to rental allowances (i.e.,
parsonage allowances), although the statutory language has
changed over time. The parsonage allowance originated from
the Revenue Act of 1921, which excluded from gross income
"[t]he rental value of a dwelling house and appurtenances
thereof furnished to a minister of the gospel as part of his
compensation." 16 Congress revised the allowance in 1954,
broadening its scope to include housing allowances paid to
ministers who were renting a home. 17 This language from the
1954 revision generally corresponded to 26 U.S.C. § 107(2)
when Warren was decided in U.S. Tax Court in 2000.18 At that
point, 26 U.S.C. § 107 stated that gross income for a "minister
of the gospel" did not include either: "(1) the rental value of a
home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or (2) the
rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation, to the
extent used by him to rent or provide a home."' 9
When Warren reached the Ninth Circuit in August 2002,
26 U.S.C. § 107(2) had been amended to include a fair rental
value cap on the allowance, limiting the allowance "to the
extent used by him to rent or provide a home and to the extent
such allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home,
includingfurnishings and appurtenancessuch as a garage,plus
20
the cost of utilities."
Regulations issued by the U.S. Treasury Department

16. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 213, 42 Stat. 227, 239 (1921)
(amended 1954). This language from the 1921 Act generally corresponds to 26
U.S.C. § 107(1). See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107(1) (LexisNexis 2002).
17. See S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 16 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4621, 4646.
Congress expanded the parsonage allowance to prevent
discrimination against ministers who had received higher (taxable) salaries
from their respective churches rather than church-provided housing that fell
within the scope of the parsonage allowance as enacted in 1921. See id.
18. See 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000) (amended 2002).
19. Warren v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 343, 346 (2000) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 107).
20. 26 U.S.C.S. § 107(2) (emphasis added). This statute was amended by
Congress in 2002, upon enacting the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-181, 116 Stat. 583 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. § 107(2) (2002)). The Act limited the parsonage allowance exclusion to
the fair rental value of the corresponding property. See id. The statute's
revision, however, has little impact on the debate over the constitutionality of
§ 107. See infra Part III.B.1.
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recognize the parsonage allowance as well. 21 An IRS revenue
ruling issued in 1971 recognizes the parsonage allowance but
limits it to "an amount equal to the fair rental value of the
home acquired ... plus the cost of utilities."22 Therefore, the
tax exclusion for ministers has been supported historically by
the federal government, although its scope has been stated
differently over time.
The parsonage allowance did not receive a great deal of
scrutiny until the late 1970s and early 1980s. 23

Scandals at

that time, coupled with U.S. Treasury Department scrutiny
and recent congressional rallying for support, have placed a
spotlight on the parsonage allowance. 24 Upon the Ninth
Circuit's constitutional probing in Warren, supporters of the
parsonage allowance lobbied Congress to devise a means of
preserving it. 25 Congress responded by enacting the Clergy
Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, which limits the
rental allowance exclusion to the fair rental value of the
minister's home. 26 According to Congress, this limitation would
remove First Amendment concerns surrounding the parsonage
21. Treasury regulations state that gross income for a "minister of the
gospel" does not include: "(1) the rental value of a home, including utilities,
furnished to him as a part of his compensation, or (2) the rental allowance
paid to him as part of his compensation to the extent such allowance is used
by him to rent or otherwise provide a home." 26 C.F.R. § 1.107-1 (2002).
22. Rev. Rul. 71-280, 1971-2 C.B. 92.
23. See Matthew W. Foster, Note, The Parsonage Allowance Exclusion:
Past,Present, and Future, 44 VAND. L. REV. 149, 159 (1991).
24. See 148 CONG. REC. H1299 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) (advocating support for the parsonage allowance); Foster, supra
note 23, at 159-63 (discussing recent scandals and U.S. Treasury Department
scrutiny). In the late 1970s, the IRS cracked down on "mail-order ministries"
in which individuals purchased certificates of ordination or licensure from
promoters who were selling in the name of a church. Id. at 160. These
individuals became "ministers" of their own "churches" and operated them as
tax-exempt entities. Id. The mail-order ministers received deductions for
their contributions to their respective churches, and they received housing
allowances that were excludable under § 107. Id. at 161. The mail-order
ministers evaded paying taxes on much of their income through this scheme.
Id. Several mail-order ministers were convicted for § 107 tax fraud. Id. Thus,
the mail-order minister scandals represented an early stage in governmental
scrutiny of § 107. The Treasury Department attempted to eliminate § 107 in
the 1980s under President Reagan's plan to simplify the tax system. Id. at
162. Because of swift lobbying support from constituents, the Treasury
Department's proposed plan did not succeed. Id. at 162-63.
25. See 148 CONG. REC. H1299 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) (advocating support for the parsonage allowance).
26. See Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-181, 116 Stat. 583 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2002)).
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allowance because it would address the issue involved in
Warren when it was decided in U.S. Tax Court. 27 Presumably,
the issue referred to is whether the § 107(2) parsonage
allowance is capped at the fair rental value of the minister's
28
home.
II. OVERVIEW OF TAXPAYER STANDING, FIRST
AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A taxpayer challenging the constitutionality of the
parsonage allowance in federal court must establish standing
to sue. 29 Frothingham v. Mellon 30 represents the Supreme
Court's default position on taxpayer standing, but Flast v.
Cohen carved out an exception to the Frothinghamrule. 3 1 Post32
Flast cases appear to reduce the scope of this exception.
Because the parsonage allowance's compliance with the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause is at issue,
discussion of this tax exclusion should be made in the context of
major Supreme Court Establishment Clause tests. The Court
has applied the Lemon test for years, although its significance
has been reduced over time as other tests such as the
"endorsement test" have been applied. 33
The parsonage
allowance tax exclusion should also be examined under
Supreme Court case precedent regarding tax exemptions for
religious organizations. Walz v. Tax Commission34 and Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock 35 are two significant cases in this area.
27.

See 148 CONG. REC. H1300 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Rep.

Ramstad) ("The legislation on the floor today will stop the attack on the
housing allowance by resolving the underlying issue in the tax court case.");
see also Warren v. Comm'r, 302 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002).

28. See supra text accompanying note 6. The statute's revision, however,
has little impact on the debate over the constitutionality of § 107. See infra
Part III.B.1.
29. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
30. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
31. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988) ("[We have
consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it created to the
general rule against taxpayer standing established in Frothingham....).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 64-72 (describing strict application
of Flast exception).
33. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 280-83 (2d ed. 2003).
34. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
35. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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A. TAXPAYER STANDING: DEFAULT RULE AND EXCEPTION

A plaintiff must establish standing to adjudicate a claim in
federal court. 36 The purpose of the standing doctrine is to
ensure that the plaintiff has alleged a "personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy" resulting in "concrete
adverseness." 37 The plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in
fact" and there must be a causal link between the harm and the
defendant's alleged action. 38 The injury must be "concrete and
particularized" and "actual or imminent."39 Although plaintiffs
are usually able to establish standing in traditional cases
involving direct injury, 40 problems may occur when plaintiffs
41
make allegations as part of a larger group, such as taxpayers.
The Frothingham v. Mellon decision established a default
position against federal taxpayer standing.4 2 In this early case,
the Court addressed whether a taxpayer had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the Maternity Act.43 The
plaintiff alleged that the federal statute at issue would increase
her future tax burden and thus result in a taking of property
without due process of law.4 4 The Court determined the
taxpayer did not have standing, basing its conclusion first on
separation of powers principles. 45 The Court stated that when
an individual files a claim challenging the constitutionality of a
federal law, but lacks a direct or immediately threatened
46
injury, the court is not deciding a judicial controversy.
According to the Court, the plaintiff did not suffer such an
injury because she was airing a complaint "merely that officials
of the executive department of the government are executing
36. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
37. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
38. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
39. Id.
40. See Richard M. Elias, Note, Confusion in the Realm of Taxpayer
Standing: The State of State Taxpayer Standing in the Eighth Circuit, 66 MO.
L. REV. 413, 416 (2001) ("A plaintiff usually has no problem meeting the
standing threshold because a traditional case involves a plaintiff who alleges a
direct economic or physical injury.").
41. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Justiciability Analysis, 30 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 911, 929 (1990) ("As a general rule, individuals do not have
standing solely by virtue of their status as federal taxpayers to challenge
allegedly unconstitutional conduct by officers of the federal government.").
42. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988).
43. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
44. Id. at 486.
45. See id. at 488-89.
46. Id.
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and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be
unconstitutional." 47 Without a judicial controversy and thus a
justification for enjoining executive branch officials from
executing an allegedly unconstitutional statute, the Court
would be encroaching on the powers of a coequal branch of the
48
federal government.
The Court also based its conclusion on the taxpayer's
decision to sue the federal government, as opposed to a
municipal government. 49 The Court found the plaintiffs status
as a federal taxpayer problematic because unlike a municipal
taxpayer, a federal taxpayer's interest in the moneys of the
treasury is small and uncertain because it is shared with
millions of other taxpaying citizens. 50 Furthermore, the Court
stated that because a federal taxpayer's prediction of the effects
of a federal statute on his or her future tax burden is
indeterminable, a request for equity-based relief is
unjustified.5 '
Flast v. Cohen carved out an exception to the Frothingham
default position against taxpayer standing. 52 In Flast, the
Supreme Court held that taxpayers challenging the
constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 had standing.5 3 The taxpayers alleged that federal
funds under the Act were directed toward religious schools,
thus violating the First Amendment's Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. 54 The Court determined that for a taxpayer
plaintiff to have standing, a "logical nexus" must exist between
the plaintiffs asserted status and the plaintiffs claim.5 5 The
Court's "logical nexus" test requires the taxpayer to establish
the following: a logical link between taxpayer status and the
type of legislative program at issue, and a logical link between
taxpayer status and the nature of the alleged constitutional
violation.5 6 According to the majority, the taxpayers met both
47. Id. at 488.
48. Id. at 488-89.
49. Id. at 486-87.
50. Id. at 487.
51. Id. The plaintiff sought equity-based relief through an injunction
preventing the execution of a federal law (the Maternity Act) because it was
allegedly unconstitutional. See id. at 486.
52. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988).
53. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85, 106 (1968).
54. Id. at 85-86.
55. Id. at 102.
56. Id.
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"logical nexus" test requirements to have proper standing. 57
The taxpayers met the first prong because they were
challenging a federal spending program, and they met the
second prong because they alleged that Congress, in enacting
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, had breached a
specific limitation on its Article I, 58
Section 8 taxing and
spending power under the Constitution.
The majority distinguished Frothingham,noting that the
taxpayer in Frothingham alleged "generalized grievances"
rather than breaches of specific limitations upon Congress's
taxing and spending power. 59 The Flast plaintiff alleged a
60
violation of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause,
which according to the Court, is a "specific bulwark against...
potential abuses of governmental power" and functions as a
specific constitutional limitation on Congress's taxing and
spending powers under Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution. 6' The Frothingham plaintiff, however, alleged
that her expected additional tax burden was a due process
violation, and the Court stated that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment contains no provision shielding taxpayers
from additional tax liability. 62 Thus, according to the Court,
the Frothingham plaintiff was airing a "generalized
grievance[]" about government conduct rather than alleging a
breach of a specific limitation upon Congress's taxing and
63
spending power.
Later cases took the bite out of Flast's apparent expansion
of taxpayer standing. In Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., the
Court strictly applied the Flast "logical nexus" test and denied
standing to the taxpayer plaintiffs. 64
In this case, an
organization and several of its employees brought a First
Amendment challenge to the conveyance of surplus federal
government property to a church-related college. 65 The Court
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 103.
See id. at 103-04.
Id. at 104-06.

60.

Id. at 86.

61.

Id. at 104.

62.

Id. at 105.

63.

Id. at 105-06.

64. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479-82 (1982).
65. Id. at 468-69. Under the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the
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found no taxpayer standing, distinguishing the case from
Flast.66 Unlike the taxpayers in Flast, the Valley Forge
taxpayers were challenging actions of the executive branch, as
opposed to exercises of congressional power. 67 Furthermore,
the Court found that the property transfer in Valley Forge did
not directly relate to Congress's taxing and spending powers
under Article I, Section 8.68 Rather, it pertained to Congress's
power under the Property Clause at Article IV, Section 3,
Clause 2.69 Thus, based on the factual distinction between the
two cases, the Valley Forge Court found that the plaintiffs in
that case could not establish the first prong of the Flast "logical
70
nexus" test and thus lacked standing under that approach.
The Valley Forge Court found no other basis for standing to
bring suit because the respondents did not identify an injury
sufficient to establish standing under Article 111.71 In the years
following Valley Forge, the Court reaffirmed that although
Flast is still good law and carves out an exception to
Frothingham,the latter case's blanket ruling against taxpayer
72
standing remains intact as well.

Secretary of Education) is authorized to dispose of surplus property. Id. at
466-67.
66. See id. at 478-82.
67. Id. at 479. Specifically, the Valley Forge taxpayers were concerned
about the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's decision to transfer
property.
Id.
But see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to
Justiciability,22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 691 (1990) (arguing that this distinction
may not be important because both Congress and the executive branch are
bound by the First Amendment).
68. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (holding there was no
standing because the challenged enactment did not pertain to Congress's
taxing and spending powers, but to executive branch action in allowing certain
members of Congress to hold commissions in the Armed Forces Reserve);
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (finding there was no
standing because the taxpayer's challenge did not relate to Congress's taxing
and spending power, but to statutes regulating the CIA).
69. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480. Specifically, the property transfer
related to authorizing legislation under the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949. Id. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 67,
at 691 (arguing that this distinction is irrelevant because the Establishment
Clause under the First Amendment applies to congressional action under both
Article I and Article IV).
70. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479.
71. Id. at 485-86.
72. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988). Federal circuit
courts continue to apply the Flast "logical nexus" test in taxpayer suits. See,
e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Bugher, 249 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir.
2001); DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d Cir.

20031

AFTER WARREN

2117

B. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TESTS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."73 The presence of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of this Amendment, taken together,
causes interpretation problems 74 because if taken to their
extremes, they seemingly conflict with each other. 75 The
Supreme Court has historically taken a neutral position
between these two clauses, thus walking a "tight rope" between
religious autonomy and established religion. 76 Besides the
interpretation problems surrounding these two clauses, First
Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence as a whole is
a tangled web of seemingly unsettled doctrines and conflicting
results. 77 The Supreme Court has applied a variety of
Establishment Clause tests over the years, and it is unclear
which test is currently controlling, thus adding to the
78
confusion.
1. Establishment Clause Tests
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, decided in 1971, the Supreme
Court developed a three-part test for Establishment Clause
violations. 79 The case dealt with Rhode Island's Salary
Supplement Act, which permitted nonpublic school teachers to
receive an additional fifteen percent in salary. 80 The Act
2001). Some federal circuit courts, however, have questioned the scope of the
Flast exception. See, e.g., Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849, 852 (8th Cir. 2002)
(expressing uncertainty about the precise scope of Flast), cert. denied, 123 S.
Ct. 883 (2003); Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Flast v.
Cohen appears to create a fairly narrow exception to the Frothingham
rule .... ).

73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. See Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom:
Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 BYU L. REV. 7, 49.
75. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). But see Carl H.
Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent
Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 890-94 (2001) (arguing that the
"[cilauses-in-conflict" argument is flawed and that it is possible for the clauses
to supplement each other).
76. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69, 672.
77. FARBER, supra note 33, at 275.
78. See id. at 280-83.
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
80. Id. at 607.
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prohibited eligible instructors from teaching religious-related
classes and permitted only courses offered in public schools. 8'
The case also dealt with Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, which allowed the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction to "purchase" certain
"secular educational services" from nonpublic schools.8 2 The
State would reimburse nonpublic schools for money spent on
"teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials." 83
Under this Act, nonpublic schools would be reimbursed only for
materials related to "secular" courses such as mathematics and
84
physical education.
The Supreme Court, using a three-part test, held that both
state statutes were unconstitutional.8 5 The Lemon Court held
that, in order to pass Establishment Clause muster, a statute
must have a secular legislative purpose, 86 its principal or
primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, 87 and
it cannot "foster 'an excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.' 88 The Court did not consider whether the statutes
met the first two requirements because they both failed the
"excessive governmental entanglement" requirement. 89 The
Court believed that even the most well-meaning instructor
would have difficulty remaining neutral under the Rhode
Island Act's provisions. 90 Furthermore, the Court stated that
under both states' statutes, the inspection and evaluation of
the religious content of an organization creates an
entanglement because it may lead to "excessive government
direction of church schools and hence of churches." 9'
The 1980s witnessed a change in the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause analysis, as the Court began showing
disapproval of the Lemon test. 92 In Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice
81.

Id. at 608.

82. Id. at 609.
83.

Id.

84. Id. at 610.
85. See id. at 609, 611.
86. Id. at 612.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
89. Id. at 613-14.
90. Id. at 618.
91. See id. at 620-21.
92. See Dean T. Barham, Note, The Parsonage Exclusion Under the
Endorsement Test: Last Gasp or Second Wind?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 397, 402
(1993); Foster, supra note 23, at 168-69.
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O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, suggested a clarification of
the Lemon test by applying an "endorsement test."93 Under the
endorsement test, the court must first determine whether the
government "intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion."94 The court then must determine
whether the government actually conveyed this message. 95 The
endorsement test has been arguably viewed as a less restrictive
96
test for scrutinizing possible Establishment Clause violations.
In Agostini v. Felton, the Court addressed the Lemon "excessive
entanglement" requirement, stating that administrative
concerns and political divisiveness, by themselves, are
insufficient to create an "excessive" entanglement. 97 Thus, the
about
post-Agostini Court appears to be less concerned
98
problems associated with governmental monitoring.
As a result, the Court appears to be moving away from the
"excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test and instead
focusing on the first two prongs of the Lemon test.99 This
approach bears a resemblance to the "endorsement test"
described above. 100 Even though Lemon governed the Court's
Establishment Clause analysis for decades and has never been
overruled, its current status is unclear and its importance,
therefore, has diminished over time.10 1 There is, however, no
clearly governing Establishment Clause test, and different
Supreme Court justices have articulated different tests over the
02
years. 1
2. Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious
Organizations
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court began developing
its position on the constitutionality of tax statutes pertaining to
religious organizations. 10 3 One of the leading early cases was

93. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
94. Id. at 691.
95. Id. at 690-91.
96. See Foster, supra note 23, at 175.
97. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997).
98. See FARBER, supra note 33, at 283.
99. See id.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88, 94-95.
101. See FARBER, supra note 33, at 280-83.
102. See id. at 282-83.
103. Foster, supra note 23, at 166.
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Walz v. Tax Commission, in which a state statute granted a tax
exemption to religious organizations using property exclusively
for religious worship.10 4 The Court upheld the exemption,
stating that the legislative purpose of the tax exemption was
"not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting
religion."' 0 5
Furthermore, the Court held that the tax
exemption did not excessively entangle government and
religion.10 6 According to the Court in Walz, a tax exemption is
not governmental sponsorship, and there is no link between tax
10 7
exemption and religious establishment.
In the late 1980s, the Court arrived at a different
conclusion when it analyzed a Texas sales tax exemption
statute. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court, in a
plurality opinion, held that a Texas sales tax exemption for
religious periodicals violated the First Amendment.1 8 The
state statute at issue provided exemptions for "religious faith"
periodicals that promote "teaching[s] of the faith" and are
"sacred to a religious faith."10 9
The Court, in its analysis, applied an "endorsement test" to
determine whether the Texas statute violated the
Establishment Clause."10 The Court found the exemption
"narrow"'" and a form of "state sponsorship of religious
belief."' 12 The exemption, the Court observed, did not pass the
endorsement test because the government is directly
subsidizing an exclusively religious organization.' 3 The Court
distinguished Walz, noting that the latter case involved a state
statute broader in scope, covering more than simply religious
organizations. ' 4 In Texas Monthly, however, the statute at

104. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970). An owner of real
estate in New York sought an injunction to prevent the state tax commission
from granting tax exemptions under the disputed statute. Id. at 666.
105.
106.

Id. at 674.
Id. at 674-76.

107. Id. at 675-76.
108. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989). The appellant in
this case was a general interest magazine publisher that did not qualify for
the exemption and paid related sales taxes under protest. Id. at 6.
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. See id. at 8-9.
111. The Court deemed the Texas statute "narrow" because it extended to
only religious organizations. Id. at 15.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 15 n.5, 15-16.
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issue referred only to religious faith periodicals. 1 5 The Texas
Monthly Court found that the Texas statute lacked a secular
objective, thus resulting in governmental endorsement of
religious belief. 116 Therefore, the Court held that the Texas
statute was unconstitutional." 17
III. A TAXPAYER'S SUIT-LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
Although a taxpayer plaintiff challenging the parsonage
allowance will encounter some difficulties with the
Frothingham default position against taxpayer standing, he or
she should be able to establish standing based on the Flast
exception carved out from Frothingham.
Once standing is established, a court will likely analyze the
parsonage allowance using Supreme Court precedent regarding
tax exemptions for religious organizations, and it will likely
apply some type of Establishment Clause test. The parsonage
allowance bears a greater resemblance to the statute at issue in
Texas Monthly than the statute in Walz. This cuts in the
taxpayer plaintiffs favor. A court applying either the Lemon
test or the endorsement test should find the parsonage
allowance unconstitutional.
A. ABILITY TO ESTABLISH TAXPAYER STANDING
1. Standing Under Frothingham
A federal taxpayer, solely because of that status, would not
have standing under Frothinghamv. Mellon' 18 to challenge the
parsonage allowance, although factual distinctions exist
between Frothingham and the current case that would increase
the
taxpayer's
likelihood
of establishing
standing.
Frothingham generally disallows taxpayer standing to bring
suit challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute, and
its holding remains the default position for taxpayer standing
despite the exceptions created in Flast.119 Like the plaintiff in
Frothingham, a taxpayer questioning § 107(2) would be
challenging a federal statute, which the Frothingham Court
115. Id. at 5.
116. Id. at 17.
117. Id. at 25.

118.

262 U.S. 447 (1923).

119. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988); Frothingham, 262 U.S.
at 486-89.
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disfavored because of the uncertain interest federal taxpayers
have in the treasury as a whole. 120 Furthermore, a taxpayer
questioning the constitutionality of § 107(2) would arguably be
airing a "generalized grievance" much like the plaintiff in
Frothingham because both plaintiffs are individuals
12
challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute. 1
A § 107 plaintiff, however, is distinguishable from the
Frothinghamplaintiff in the nature of the allegations made. In
Frothingham, the plaintiff charged Congress with enacting a
statute that would increase her future income tax burden,
resulting in a due process violation. 122 A § 107 plaintiff would
instead be asserting his or her interest in being free of taxing
and spending beyond the scope of Congress's taxing and
23
spending power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 1
As the Flast Court noted, unlike the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause, the First Amendment functions as a specific
limitation on Congress's taxing and spending powers under
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 24 Despite this
distinction, a § 107 plaintiff still may not have standing under
a strict interpretation of Frothinghambecause a federal statute
is involved.
2. Standing Under Flast
A federal taxpayer questioning the constitutionality of
§ 107(2) would have standing to sue under Flast. The plaintiffs
in both cases have some similarities: Like the Flast plaintiff, a
§ 107 plaintiff is questioning the constitutionality of a federal
statute, and in both cases the plaintiffs are alleging an
Establishment Clause violation with respect to Congress's
taxing and spending power under Article I, Section 8 of the
25
Constitution. 1
An important difference does exist, however: In Flast, the
statute at issue was a federal grant program, but § 107 is a tax

120.

See Frothingham,262 U.S. at 487.

121.

See id.; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (noting that

the taxpayer in Frothinghamaired generalized grievances in federal court).

122. Frothingham,262 U.S. at 486.
123. Such a claim resembles the plaintiffs claim in Flast. See Flast, 392
U.S. at 105. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states that "Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
124. Flast, 392 U.S. at 104-05.
125.

See id. at 105.
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exclusion. 126 It may not necessarily follow that tax exclusions
are constitutionally equivalent to federal cash grants. The
Court may choose to distinguish between the ability to spend
taxpayer money and the ability to tax a particular group of
persons less heavily. This argument carries weight upon
considering the trend in cases after Flast, in which the Court
appeared to rein in the ability of a taxpayer to assert a
constitutional violation in federal court. 127. This distinction is
not entirely convincing, however, because § 107 falls squarely
within the boundaries of Article I, Section 8. The text of this
Constitutional provision states that Congress has the power to
"lay and collect Taxes," 128 and the parsonage allowance, like
any tax exemption, reflects Congress's ability to "not tax." The
ability to "not tax" is arguably a subset of Congress's broad
power to "lay and collect Taxes." 129 Therefore, because the
factual distinction between Flast and the current case is not
material, the next step is to apply Flast's"logical nexus" test for
taxpayer standing.
A § 107 plaintiff should satisfy the Flast "logical nexus"
test for taxpayer standing. First, the plaintiff would likely
meet the first requirement of the test, establishing a link
between taxpayer status and the challenged statute. 130 Like
the plaintiff in Flast, a § 107 plaintiff is challenging the
constitutionality of a federal statute enacted pursuant to the
taxing and spending clause of Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution. 131 The necessary link exists because the plaintiff
would be a taxpayer and the statute involved pertains to
Congress's power to "lay and collect Taxes" under Article I,
Section 8.132 Therefore, a § 107 plaintiff should be able to
satisfy the first prong in the two-part Flast test for standing.
A § 107 plaintiff should also meet the second prong of the
test, establishing a link between taxpayer status and the
alleged constitutional violation. 133 Like the plaintiff in Flast, a

126.

See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2002) (noting the statute excludes

from income rental allowances provided to a "minister of the gospel"); Flast,
392 U.S. at 86 (noting the statute at issue was a federal grant program).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See supra text accompanying notes 64-72.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See id.
Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
See id. at 105.

132.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

133.

Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.

2124

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:2107

taxpayer challenging the constitutionality of § 107 is alleging
that his or her tax money is being used "in violation of specific
constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative
power." 34
As the Court noted, the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause specifically limits the taxing and
spending power provided by Article I, Section 8.135 Therefore, a
§ 107 plaintiff would likely satisfy the second part of the Flast
test and thus establish proper standing.
The Court's decisions in later cases such as Valley Forge,
Schlesinger, and Richardson should have little impact, if any,
on a § 107 plaintiffs ability to show standing. First, the
plaintiffs cause of action in the Warren scenario is
distinguishable from those of the plaintiffs in Schlesinger and
Richardson because the latter plaintiffs were challenging
executive actions that did not directly relate to Congress's
taxing and spending powers.136 Second, a § 107 plaintiffs cause
of action is distinct from the plaintiffs claim in Valley Forge.
There, the taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of
conveying surplus government property to a tax-exempt
religious organization. 37 In the present case, Congress's taxing
power would be at the forefront of the plaintiffs complaint. A
plaintiff questioning the constitutionality of a tax provision is
directly questioning an act under Congress's constitutional tax
powers. The problem with the Valley Forge plaintiffs cause of
action was its more direct link to Congress's property-related
38
powers, rather than taxing powers, under the Constitution.
Despite the Court's attempt in Valley Forge to limit the reach of
Flast, a § 107 plaintiff should be unaffected by Valley Forge
because his or her claim would be directly tied to Congress's
taxing and spending powers under the Constitution. Thus,
despite the Court's rulings since Flast, a § 107 plaintiff should

134. Id. at 106.
135. Id. at 105.
136. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
228 (1974) (holding there was no standing because the challenged enactment

did not pertain to Congress's taxing and spending powers, but to executive
branch action in allowing certain members of Congress to hold commissions in
the Armed Forces Reserve); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175
(1974) (finding there was no standing because the taxpayer's challenge does
not relate to Congress's taxing and spending power, but to statutes regulating

the CIA).
137. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 464 (1982).
138. See id. at 480.
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be able to establish proper standing in federal court on Flast
taxpayer standing theory.
3.

Standing Under Traditional Standing Principles

A federal taxpayer questioning the constitutionality of the
parsonage allowance would probably not have any basis for
standing outside of the taxpayer standing context to sue in
federal court. The § 107 plaintiff would have to show an "injury
in fact" that is concrete and personal to the plaintiff. 139 The
average taxpayer who does not receive any housing allowance
would have a difficult time arguing that an injury occurred
merely because he or she knew of a minister that was able to
exclude housing allowance funds from gross income. Such a
claim falls under the "generalized grievance" category that the
Frothingham Court disfavored and rejected when determining
standing. 40 A taxpayer who receives a housing allowance from
a non-church organization (and is thus taxable) would have a
better chance of establishing standing outside of the Flast
context because he or she could point to a specific injury-being
taxed on a housing allowance that ministers can exclude from
their income. 141 This taxpayer would still need to satisfy other
constitutionally required and prudential requirements for
standing, so it is unclear whether the taxpayer would be likely
to establish standing under the traditional approach. 42 In
general,
the
average
taxpayer
(including Professor
Chemerinksy, should he decide to sue in federal district court)
not receiving a housing allowance would have a significantly
139. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
140. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923); see also Flast,
392 U.S. at 106 (noting that the taxpayer in Frothingham aired generalized
grievances in federal court).
141. See Rakowski, supra note 11, at 781; cf. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 6 (1989) (noting that appellant, a general interest magazine
publisher, filed suit after paying sales taxes that religious faith-based
publishers did not have to pay under Texas law).

142. Constitutional requirements for standing in federal court include a
cognizable injury that is actual and imminent, causation, and redressibility
through judicial action. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19

(1998).
Prudential requirements for standing include no generalized
grievances, no third party rights, and the plaintiffs injury must be within in
the "zone of interests" to be protected by the statute in question. See id. at 20,
23; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). A taxpayer seeking to challenge
the constitutionality of the § 107 parsonage allowance may file a federal claim
in state court as well, and would be subject to the corresponding state law
standing requirement.
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better chance of establishing standing under the Flast doctrine
of taxpayer standing.
B. THE PARSONAGE ALLOWANCE UNDER ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE TESTS AND TAX EXEMPTION-RELATED CASE PRECEDENT

First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
14 3
confusing and contains seemingly unsettled doctrines.
Furthermore, there is no telling which Establishment Clause
test a federal court would use if a taxpayer brought suit
challenging the parsonage allowance. Therefore, a proper
analysis of the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance
should cover two primary areas: the major Supreme Court tests
used to uncover Establishment Clause violations and case
precedent pertaining to tax exemptions for religious
organizations.
1. Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause Tests
A court should find § 107 unconstitutional when applying
the Lemon test. 144 First, the parsonage allowance does not
have a secular legislative purpose. 145 The text of the statute
46
describes tax exclusions for "minister[s] of the gospel" only.
Legislative history from Congress's statutory revisions in 1954
shows that the purpose of the parsonage allowance was to
assist ministers and only ministers. 47 Regardless of any intent
to treat housing allowances and directly-provided church
housing equally, non-religious individuals and organizations
were not contemplated by Congress as the beneficiaries of
§ 107.148 Furthermore, recent legislative history surrounding
the 2002 parsonage allowance revisions demonstrates
Congress's concern about the well-being of ministers. 149 Again,
143. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
144. It is unclear whether a court dealing with § 107 would apply the
Lemon test. See FARBER, supra note 33, at 280-81. However, because of

Lemon's historical importance and its status as good law, this Comment
includes a Lemon analysis of § 107.
145. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (noting that the first

requirement for constitutionality is a secular legislative purpose).
146. 26 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2002).
147. See Foster, supra note 23, at 152.
148. Id.
149. See 148 CONG. REC. H1299 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) ("Clergy members of every faith and denomination rely on the

housing allowance. Without it, America's clergy face a devastating tax
increase of $2.3 billion over the next 5 years.").
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the legislative history points to a non-secular purpose for the
150
parsonage allowance.
Second, § 107 primarily advances religion. 15 1
The
parsonage allowance benefits ministers by excluding rental
allowances from gross income, and churches benefit by
presumably being able to pay their clergy lower salaries
because of the non-taxable allowance. 152 Thus, by paying out
less money in salaries, churches have additional funds
available for other purposes, such as advertising, facility
upgrades, and religious education. All of these activities
arguably "advance religion." Therefore, § 107 advances religion
because ministers and churches benefit from the parsonage
allowance by having more monetary resources available.
Third, § 107 creates an excessive entanglement with
religion. 153 By permitting the tax exemption for "ministers of
the gospel," the government has to determine on a case-by-case
basis who "ministers of the gospel" are. 54 For example, the
government must determine whether nonordained ministers
and ministers who are employed by their respective churches
for educational purposes are within the scope of the parsonage
allowance. These are borderline cases that the IRS must
inevitably analyze because corresponding Treasury regulations
provide only a limited number of examples of "ministers of the
gospel" as a guide. 155 Advocates of § 107 could argue that
taxing ministers on their rental allowances would actually
create a greater entanglement because the government would
have to monitor whether this income was properly reported.
The problem with this argument is that it assumes greater IRS
scrutiny is necessary when additions to income, rather than
exclusions, are reported. This, however, may not be the case.
Arguably, the IRS is more suspicious of taxpayers attempting
to reduce their income through exclusions. Therefore, greater
150. See id.
151. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (noting that the
second requirement for constitutionality is that the statute's principal effect

neither advances nor inhibits religion).
152. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2002).
153. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (noting that the third requirement for
constitutionality is that the statute may not create an excessive government

entanglement with religion).
154.

See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107.

155. Arguably, because the phrase "ministers of the gospel" encompasses a
wide range of unspecified duties, the statute could be struck down for
vagueness, thus allowing a court to avoid any constitutional issues.
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entanglement likely exists now because the government must
determine the propriety of each tax exemption taken by
56
ministers. 1
The Court's more
recent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence also favors the view that the parsonage
allowance violates the Clause. Although Agostini resulted in
less emphasis on the "excessive entanglement" prong of the
Lemon test because the Court was less concerned with
administrative issues, this may work to the taxpayer plaintiffs
advantage. On the one hand, if a court were to apply a strict
Lemon test, the taxpayer plaintiff may have a problem because
his or her primary "excessive entanglement" argument is that a
tax exemption for ministers creates additional governmental
monitoring, an administrative concern that the Agostini Court
seems less worried about. On the other hand, if a court were to
not apply a complete Lemon test and instead applied an
"endorsement test" or focused mainly on the first two prongs of
the Lemon test, the taxpayer plaintiff may succeed. The
parsonage allowance resembles the Texas statute at issue
under Texas Monthly, where the Court applied an endorsement
test. Furthermore, as previously stated above, a taxpayer
should be able to meet the first two prongs of the Lemon test.
Therefore, under the more recent approaches used by the Court
for Establishment Clause analysis, a taxpayer challenging the
parsonage allovance should succeed.
Recent amendments to § 107 should have no impact on a
court's determination of the statute's constitutionality. The
Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002 limited the
rental allowance exclusion to the fair rental value of the
minister's home. 157 Although Congress was confident that the
rental exclusion cap would end any constitutional controversies
surrounding the parsonage allowance, it is unclear how this
would be possible. 158 The constitutional issue is not the size of
the parsonage allowance, but that § 107 creates tax benefits for
ministers only.

156.

But cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1997) (noting that it is

less likely that administrative concerns alone will trigger an Establishment
Clause violation).
157. Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107181, 116 Stat. 583 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2002)).
158. Rakowski, supra note 11,
constitutionality remains at issue).

at

779-80

(noting

that

§

107's
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2. Constitutionality Under the Tax Exemption-Related Case
Precedent
The § 107 parsonage allowance is unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds under Texas Monthly. In that case, the
Court held that a Texas state statute granting sales tax
exemptions to publishers of religious periodicals was
unconstitutional. 159 A similar result would likely occur in the
present case because § 107 and the Texas statute in Texas
Monthly both restrict their respective tax exemptions to
religious purposes only. 160 Nowhere does § 107 mention that
anyone other than "ministers of the gospel" would receive a tax
exclusion. 16' Likewise, the language in the Texas statute at
issue in Texas Monthly confined its sales tax exemption to
162
publishers and distributors of "religious faith" periodicals.
The Texas statute did not provide a sales tax exclusion for nonreligious faith periodicals. 163 Therefore, based on the initial
similarities of the two statutes, a court should find § 107
unconstitutional.
One could argue that differences exist between the Texas
Monthly statute and the parsonage allowance, and these
differences justify the constitutional validity of § 107. The crux
of this argument is that § 107, when read in pari materia with
other tax exclusions in the Internal Revenue Code, is merely
part of a larger system of tax exclusions created by the Federal
64
Government for the benefit of several types of individuals.'
Section 119 of the Code, for example, excludes the value of
housing furnished by an employer for the benefit of the
employer from gross income, provided the housing is on the
corresponding business premises. 165 The Code also provides
159.
160.

Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989).
26 U.S.C.S § 107 (LexisNexis 2002) (noting that tax exemptions are

provided only to "minister[s] of the gospel"); see also Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at
5 (noting that under the Texas statute at issue, only "religious faith"

periodicals received sales tax exemptions).
161. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 107.
162. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
163. Id.
164. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970).
165. 26 U.S.C.S. § 119 (LexisNexis 2002). Advocates of § 107 could argue

that § 107(1) (pertaining to homes furnished to ministers of the gospel) is
covered by the lodging exclusion of the benefit-to-the-employer doctrine under
§ 119. The problem with this argument, however, is that the two statutes are
not entirely the same: Section 119 is more restrictive because it requires the

housing to be on the business premises and in pursuant to employment, but
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exclusions for military personnel and U.S. citizens living
abroad. 166 Advocates of § 107 could argue that because the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld on First Amendment grounds individual
statutes providing benefits to both religious and non-religious
organizations, the Court should uphold the parsonage
allowance because it provides benefits to religious
organizations within a larger network of benefits to non67
religious organizations. 1
The Texas Monthly Court, however, still found the tax
exemption statute unconstitutional despite other Texas
168
statutes that provided tax exemptions for other activities.
The Court noted that even though Texas grants other sales tax
exemptions for different purposes (for example, food sales and
sales of agricultural items), the exemption for religious
periodicals was still invalid because it lacked an overall secular
purpose that encouraged similar benefits for nonreligious
activities. 169 The parsonage allowance, as well, lacks such an
overall secular purpose because its benefits are conferred only
to religious organizations and activities. 170 Thus, because the
in pari materia approach did not persuade the Court in Texas
Monthly, parsonage allowance advocates should not expect the
same argument to work if the Court hears a § 107 case.
A case involving the constitutionality of § 107 is distinct
from Walz because of the scope of each statute. The Court
upheld the tax provision in Walz because it benefited several
organizations besides religious groups and therefore had a
secular purpose under the Lemon test.' 7' Section 107, however,
read by itself is limited to only religious organizations. 172 The
narrowness of § 107's tax exemption makes it a likely candidate
for unconstitutionality in a future court ruling. Advocates of
§ 107(1) does not contain these requirements. See id. §§ 107, 119. Therefore,

it is possible that a minister of the gospel could receive § 107 benefits (but not
§ 119 benefits) for a house located miles away from the church building and
used primarily for non-church-related activities.

166. Id. § 134 (providing an income exclusion for "qualified military
benefits," which includes a wide range of allowances and in-kind benefits); id.
§ 911 (providing an income exclusion for housing costs for qualified U.S.
citizens or residents living abroad).
167. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 673.
168. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 n.4.
169. Id.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 144-50 (discussing the parsonage
allowance's non-secular purpose under the Lemon test).
171. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
172. 26 U.S.C.S. § 107 (LexisNexis 2002).
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§ 107 may argue that the parsonage allowance resembles the
statute in Walz when analyzed in terms of a larger network of
tax exemptions in the Code. As discussed above, however, the
Court in Texas Monthly, a more recent case than Walz, did not
adhere to this in pari materia argument. 173 Therefore, the
parsonage allowance is distinguishable from the statute in
Walz.
CONCLUSION
The parsonage allowance provides a tax exclusion for
ministers. Because this exclusion applies only to ministers, its
constitutionality is in question. Although the Ninth Circuit in
Warren did not address the issue of whether the parsonage
allowance violates the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause, it left open the possibility of a taxpayer suit.
The average taxpayer questioning the constitutionality of
the § 107 parsonage allowance in court should be successful.
The taxpayer should have standing under the Flast approach to
taxpayer standing, although he or she would have a more
difficult time under the traditional standard. The statutory
language and legislative history of the parsonage allowance
suggest a nonsecular, religious purpose. Perhaps the most
telling sign of trouble for the parsonage allowance is Texas
Monthly and the resemblance of § 107 to the statute in that
case. Surprisingly, the parsonage allowance survived serious
constitutional challenge for years after Texas Monthly. Time
may have run out on § 107, given the publicity created by the
Ninth Circuit and the Chemerinsky intervention.

173.

See Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14 n.4.
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